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LIFTING THE MUSEUM'S BURDEN
FROM THE BACKS OF THE
UNIVERSITY: SHOULD THE ART
COLLECTION BE TREATED AS PART
OF THE ENDOWMENT?
LINDA SUGIN*
Abstract: A few universities in economic straits have recently attempted to
sell artwork to address their financial woes, causing much consternation in
the museum community. This Article relates the stories of some institutions'
attempts to deaccession artworks, and explains why universities may
suddenly perceive their art collections as important assets to monetize. It
contends that the universities and their critics have fundamentally divergent
conceptions of the role of the art collection in the university, which explains
why they cannot agree on the legal responsibilities of universities vis-a-vis
their art. The critics have a strong cultural-property conception that
privileges art, while these universities see their collections as similar to other
property they use in carrying out their programs. This article advocates a
contextual approach for choosing among these conceptions.
The legal regime that governs the responsibilities of university fiduciaries in
managing and selling property generally depends on categorization as
endowment or program-related property. Unfortunately, there is no clear law
determining whether university art collections should be treated as
endowment property subject to the statutory rules of investment
responsibility, program-related property governed by fiduciary duties, or
cultural property subject to its own unique standards. The Article concludes
that university art collections are hybrid cultural-instrumental property, and
that universities should be subject to a more flexible standard than museums
in making deaccessioning decisions. It argues that university trustees would
be faced with too great a fiduciary-duty conflict if subject to the stricter
museum standard. To accommodate the cultural-property concerns, it
proposes that trustees exercise a heightened level of attention when selling
art, but retain their discretion to act in the best interests of the university.
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INTRODUCTION
Universities seem to be increasingly turning to their art collections
as piggy banks. On January 26, 2009, the trustees of Brandeis University
announced their decision to close the University's Rose Art Museum and
sell the art collection.' Brandeis had suffered a loss in its endowment, and
the University's trustees, who had been particularly hurt by the Madoff
fraud, were unable to increase their giving to address the fiscal problems.2
In the museum world, selling art for operating expenses is an unthinkable
transgression.3 As soon as the decision was announced, protests were
staged at the school,4 newspapers published Op-Ed pieces condemning the
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to Jennifer Bassett and Renee
Reekie for excellent research assistance.
1. See Ellen Howards, Cutting off the Rose: Brandeis Not Smelling So Sweet, ART NEW
ENGLAND, Apr.-May 2009, available at http://www.artnewengland.com/issues/AprilMay
_2009/cutting-off-the-rose.html; Randy Kennedy & Carol Vogel, Outcry over a Plan to Sell
Museum's Holdings, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2009, at Cl, available at 2009 WLNR 1605421.
2. See Howards, supra note 1; Kennedy & Vogel, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Lee Rosenbaum, He's a Museum Leader for These Troubled Times, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at D7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12330114940971
7313.html (showing that Michael Conforti, the President of the Association of Art Museum
Directors (AAMD), does not believe that deaccessioning to raise funds is a viable option for
struggling museums).
4. See Lisa Kocian, Students Rally for Brandeis Museum: Loss Will Hurt School
Stature, Protestors Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1775207.
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decision, and the presidents of the American Association of Museums, the
College Art Association and the Association of College and University
Museums and Galleries all issued statements critical of the decision.5
Shortly thereafter, heirs of donors and museum overseers filed suit to
enjoin the closure and sale,6 and the Attorney General of Massachusetts
started an investigation] There is a trial set for July 2010, though it is still
unclear whether it will be necessary. 8 The massive outpouring of criticism
apparently led the University to reconsider.9 For now, the sale is on hold,
and the Rose is open with an exhibition of its collection.' ° The museum's
director has been let go, I' and Brandeis's President, Jehuda Reinharz, has
announced that he will step down.
12
Fisk University, Nashville's oldest African American university, was
established in 1866 to educate newly freed slaves.' 3 It boasts an impressive
list of alumni and has long been highly respected in the educational
community. In 1949, Georgia O'Keeffe, as executor of her husband's
estate, gave Fisk the Alfred Stieglitz collection of paintings and
photographs by Stieglitz and other artists. 14 She also supplemented
Stieglitz's collection with four additional paintings that she owned.' 5 The
gift came with restrictions against dividing up or selling the collection,
16
modification of which would require a court to determine that it would be
impossible or impracticable for the University to comply with the
restrictions. In 2005, when the University found itself in fiscal distress,
5. See Howards, supra note 1.
6. See Alana Abramson, Discovery Process Begins in Lawsuit, JUSTICE ONLINE.COM,
Oct. 20, 2009, http://media.www.thejusticeonline.com/media/storage/paper573/news/2009
/10/20/News/Discovery.Process.Begins.In.Lawsuit-3807495.shtml.
7. See Howard, supra note 1.
8. See Abramson, supra note 6.
9. See Ariel Wittenberg, Rose Blooms Again at Brandeis, DAILY NEWS TRIB.
(Waltham, Mass.), Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://www.dailynewstribune.com/news
/x876590494/Rose-blooms-again-at-Brandeis (showing that Brandeis has left the question
of what will happen to the art in the Rose Art museum unanswered).
10. Id.
11. See Amy Rogers Nazarov, Death with Dignity: Ethical Considerations for Museum
Closures, MUSEUM, July-Aug. 2009, at 38.
12. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Op-Ed., The Art of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at
A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/opinion/02dobrzynski.html.
13. In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-II, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008), rev'd
sub nom, Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-R3-
CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009).
14. Georgia O'Keeffe Found., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *7-8.
15. Id. at *2.
16. Id.
2010]
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Fisk filed a cy pres petition 17 requesting judicial permission to sell two
paintings from the collection in order to "generate funds for the
University's 'business plan' to restore its endowment; improve its
mathematics, biology, and business administration departments; and build a
new science building.' 8 The Georgia O'Keeffe Museum intervened, and
the original petition to the court was changed to a request to approve a
"settlement" with the O'Keeffe Museum. Under that settlement agreement,
the Museum would buy "Radiator Building" from Fisk for $7.5 million.19
While that motion was pending with the court, the University conducted
discussions with another museum that was also interested in acquiring an
interest in the collection. As a result, Fisk further modified its request to the
court, proposing instead that the court approve a sale of a fifty percent
undivided interest in the entire Stieglitz collection for $30 million to the
Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art.20 That museum is currently
being built by Alice Walton, the Wal-Mart heiress, in Bentonville,
Arkansas.2' Pursuant to the proposed agreement, Fisk University and
Crystal Bridges would each have the right to display the collection at their
respective facilities for six months each year.
22
The trial court refused to grant cy pres relief to Fisk, which was
necessary for it to enter into one of the proposed agreements,23 and it
seemed that Fisk was required to keep the art, no matter how severe its
financial problems might become. But on appeal, the court opened the door
to possible cy pres relief by deciding first, that the O'Keeffe Museum
lacked standing in the case and, second, that the trial court had erred in
applying the cy pres doctrine in too restrictive a manner.2 4 Specifically, it
determined that the gift of the Stieglitz collection to Fisk was motivated by
a general charitable intent, overturning the trial court's decision that it was
motivated by a specific intent that would have operated to bar cy pres
relief.25 The case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to
determine the final prong of the cy pres analysis: whether "compliance with
17. Cy pres is "[t]he equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a written instrument
with a gift to charity as closely to the donor's intention as possible, so that the gift does not
fail." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009).
18. Georgia O'Keeffe Found, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *4.
19. Id. at *4-5.
20. Id. at *5.
21. See Theo Emery, Fisk University and Museum of Wal-Mart Heiress Agree to Share
Prized Art, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/
arts/design/26fisk.html.
22. Georgia O'Keeffe Found., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *5.
23. See id.
24. Id. at *36 & n.9.
25. Id. at *47-48.
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the conditions imposed by Ms. O'Keeffe are impossible or
impracticable., 26 The parties are currently hopeful that they will be allowed
to proceed with the deal.27
In 2007, Randolph College, a small college in Lynchburg, Virginia,
petitioned the court for approval to sell a small number of the paintings that
it had purchased with funds from a trust created by a donor for the purpose
of forming "a permanent collection of art.",28 The college had been put on
warning in 2006 by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools for
spending its endowment too quickly, and sale of the paintings was part of a
larger strategy to rebuild the endowment and improve the financial
condition of the college. 29 Angry alumnae, who may have been primarily
concerned about the decision of the college to become co-educational,30
intervened and were granted a temporary injunction against the sale. 31
That injunction prevented the college from selling the paintings in the
November 2007 auctions, a high point in art values.32 The injunction was
lifted when the plaintiffs were unable to assemble the necessary $1 million
bond to secure the injunction.33 In May 2008, the college sold only a single
painting, Rufino Tamayo's Troubador for $7,209,000, 34 determining that it
was not advantageous to sell the other works at that time.35 The college did
not lose its accreditation,3 6 and despite public criticism of its decision to
26. Id. at *49.
27. See Emery, supra note 21; see also Lindsay Pollock, On the Road: Nashville's Fisk
University, ART MARKET NEWS, Aug. 6, 2009, http://lindsaypollock.com/news/on-the-road-
nashville%E2%80%99s-fisk-university/.
28. Complaint at 2, Randolph Coll. v. Suntrust Bank, No. CL07001745-00 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2007).
29. Id. at 3-4.
30. Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon Woman's Coll., 661 S.E.2d 801, 802 (Va. 2008).
31. See id.; see also John E. Klein, College Will Sell Painting in Latin American
Auction, RANDOLPH C. NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008, http://web.randolphcollege.edu/newsevents/
pressreleases/news detail.asp?id=992; Posting of Randolph College Plays Hardball; Anti-
Art Sales Lawsuit Dropped to ARTSJOURNAL Weblog, http://www.artsjoumal.com/
culturegrrl/2008/03/randolphcollegeplayshardbal.html (Mar. 10, 2008, 12:13 EST).
32. See JIANPING MEI & MICHAEL MOSES, 2009 YEAR END ART MARKET INSIGHTS fig. 1
(2009), http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/20 1 0/01/Mei-Moses-2009-
Year-End-Alert.pdf.
33. See Klein, supra note 31.
34. See Christa Desrets, Randolph College's 'Troubadour' Sells for $7.2 Million, NEWS
& ADVANCE (Lynchburg, Va.), May 28, 2008, available at http://www2.newsadvance.
com/ina/news/local/article/randolphcollegestroubadour sells for_72_million/5279/.
35. Klein, supra note 31.
36. See Randolph College Family Advisory Council, http://www.randolphcollege.edu/
x15119.xml (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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deaccession art for operating funds, the college has indicated that it still
intends to sell the three other works when it is profitable to do SO.
3 7
In the spring of 2008, there were big floods in the Midwest, one of
which inundated the University of Iowa Museum of Art38 and caused $16
million in damages to the arts campus. 39 One member of the Iowa Board of
Regents, Michael Gartner, thought it would be a good idea to have the
University's painting Mural by Jackson Pollock appraised in case the
University needed to sell it to finance the repairs. n The outpouring of
concern and condemnation was overwhelming, coming from the
Association of Art Museum Directors, blogging critics, local newspapers,
the Wall Street Journal, the Chronicle of Higher Education, and even
41Iowa's Lieutenant Governor. Unlike many university museums, the
University of Iowa Museum of Art and its director were members of the
American Association of Museums and Association of Art Museum
Directors at the time, important organizations in the museum community.
These organizations adhere to demanding standards for deaccessioning
works.42 In addition, the University had a policy containing procedures for
selling art, which also limited the circumstances of any sale.43 The Iowa
Regents requested that the University conduct a study concerning the
Pollock.an Completed in October 2008, that study estimated that the
painting was worth $140 million.45 It also revealed that 181,575 people
visited the University of Iowa Museum of Art over the five years between
2003 and 2008,46 a miniscule number of visitors compared to major
museums. 47 On the receipt of the report, the Board of Regents concluded its
37. See Desrets, supra note 34.
38. See Scott Jaschik, Avoiding the Next Brandeis, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Oct. 1, 2009,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/10/01/art.
39. News Release, Univ. of Iowa, FEMA Announces Financing Options for Flood-
Damaged UI Buildings (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.news-releases.uiowa.edu/
2009/january/012609fema.html.
40. See Posting of Repose for Iowa's Pollock? Museum Director Is Optimistic to
ARTSJOURNAL WEBLOG, http://www.artsjoumal.com/culturegrrU/2008/08/repose for iowas_
pollockmuseu.html (Aug. 13, 2008, 10:53 EST) [hereinafter Iowa's Pollock]; see also
Jaschik, supra note 38; UNIV. OF IOWA, REPORT ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO SALE OF
JACKSON POLLOCK'S 1943 PAINTING MURAL 1 (2008), available at http://www.regents.iowa.
gov/news/Pollockquestions 1008.pdf [hereinafter REPORT].
41. See Iowa's Pollock, supra note 40; REPORT, supra note 40, at 4, 6, 9.
42. See infra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
43. See generally REPORT, supra note 40, at 8.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Posting of MoMA Monster Refuses to Shrink: NY City Council Committee Hearing
[Vol. 44:541
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inquiry into the matter, and no further steps have since been taken to sell
the painting.a
For $200 in 1878, Thomas Jefferson Medical College purchased a
painting by Thomas Eakins depicting Dr. Samuel D. Gross, a Jefferson
Medical College professor, lecturing a group of students. 49 About 500
people a year would go to see it in a medical college building. 50 On
November 10, 2006, the Thomas Jefferson University Board voted to sell
the painting for $68 million to the National Gallery of Art in Washington
and the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art. 51 Philadelphia Mayor
John Street immediately nominated the painting "for protection under the
city's historic preservation ordinance, noting the painting's deep historical
and cultural resonance throughout Philadelphia."5 2 A designation under that
ordinance would allow the city to prevent it from being moved.53 The city
never had to go through with that process because the deal the University
struck with the intended purchasers gave local museums and government
institutions forty-five days to match the offer.5 4 After a citywide
flndraising effort and the sale of two paintings and two drawings, the
Philadelphia Museum of Art and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine
Arts managed to raise the $68 million needed to keep The Gross Clinic in
Philadelphia.5
to ARTSJOURNAL Weblog, http://www.artsjoumal.com/culturegrrl/2009/10/momamonst
errefuses to-shrink.html (Oct. 6, 2009, 17:53 EST); Museum of Modem Art (MoMA),
New York, Case Studies, http://www.acoustiguide.com/case-studies/54130 (last visited Apr.
15, 2010) (noting that the Museum of Modem Art receives 2.5 million visitors per year).
48. See Jaschik, supra note 38.
49. See Carol Vogel, A Fight to Keep an Eakins Is Waged on Two Fronts: Money and
Civic Pride, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at E43, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/15/arts/design/15voge.html.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Posting of New Wrinkles in Philly's Save-the-Eakins Campaign to
ARTSJOURNAL Weblog, http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2006/1 /newwrinkles_
inphillyssaveth.html (Nov. 21, 2006, 09:05 EST).
53. Vogel, supra note 49.
54. See Carol Vogel, Philadelphia Raises Enough Money to Retain a Masterpiece by
Eakins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at E3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/
24/arts/design/24gros.html.
55. Id.
2010]
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I. Understanding the Deaccessioning Conflict
A. Practical Explanations for the University Deaccessioning Trend
Why are universities suddenly deaccessioning art works, many of
which they have held for decades? The first explanation is that art has
become very valuable, and universities own a substantial amount of it.
Universities generally own the art in their university museums. 56 The Rose
Art Museum does not own the art that it displays; Brandeis University
does.57 If the museums within colleges and universities independently
controlled their art collections, their singular focus on art and familiarity
with museum norms would make them significantly less likely to turn to
their collections for financial support. Compared to a diversified portfolio
over time, art has been a surprisingly good investment. 58 As of year-end
2009, compound annual returns for art were 5.5% (ten year average annual
return) and 3.3% (five year average annual return), substantially exceeding
the returns on stocks of -1.3% and -0.1% respectively. 59 The years at issue
in each story described above were bonanza years for the art market. From
2002 to 2007, annual growth in the value of art averaged almost twenty
percent. 60 Over longer terms, art has not performed quite as well as stocks,
but it has not been a bad investment.6'
At the same time that art values were soaring, financial pressures on
universities were increasing, prompting widespread searching for
resources. Endowments have declined, state funding has declined, and
universities have responded aggressively to financial conditions by cutting
staff and programs and halting expansion projects.62 According to the most
recent study by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers, university endowments have declined by an average of
18.7% for the latest fiscal year (July 2008-June 2009), a devastating loss in
56. See Daniel Grant, When the Going Gets Tough, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at D7,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123361946627041509.html.
57. See Geoff Edgers, Ailing Brandeis Will Shut Museum, Sell Treasured Art, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2009/01/27
/ailing~brandeis_will shut-museum sell treasuredart/?page=2.
58. See MEI & MOSES, supra note 32.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 4 fig. 1 "Stocks outperformed art over the last twenty five years with a
compound annual return ("CAR") of 10.4 percent compared to 6.5 percent for art. However,
for the last fifty years the returns were very close with art achieving a CAR of 8.9%
compared to the 9.4% for equities." Id. at 2.
62. See Louis Lavelle, University Endowments: Worst Year Since Depression, Bus.
WK., Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/jan2010/bs20100127_
36065 l.htm.
[Vol. 44:541
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value.63 Universities have responded with cuts to all sorts of programs and
have resisted privileging any single facet of their institutions. 64 The
formulas that universities use to determine their endowment spending will
result in significantly less money over the next few years on account of
these losses.65
The search for value in university art collections is consistent with the
latest public debate about university endowments. Until the market collapse
in late 2008, the big question about endowments was whether universities
were hoarding their resources. 66 Universities came to lawmakers' attention
for failing to provide current value from their considerable wealth,67 and it
seemed possible that they would become subject to a mandatory payout
rule.68 Under current law, only private foundations are required to pay out
an annual fixed percentage of their endowments.69 Identifying the untapped
value in university art collections is related to the pre-recession pressure on
universities to extract current value from long-term investments because
they are both about realizing current value from stores of wealth. While
calls for compelling payouts died down as the wealthiest universities
enhanced their financial aid programs with greater spending from their
endowments, 70 and endowment values declined, the idea of looking for
untapped sources of revenue is even more important as the financial
problems facing universities worsen.
The issue of deaccessioning art by universities in financial straits
deserves attention because there are a huge number of art museums and
63. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Bus. Officers, 2009 NACUBO-
Commonfund Study of Endowments (Jan 28, 2010), http://www.nacubo.org/Documents
/research/2009_NCSEPressRelease.pdf.
64. See Responses to the Downturn: A Survey of Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 9, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Responses-to-the-Downturn-A/47421/ (showing
hiring freezes, layoffs, and budget cuts in various areas).
65. See Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: What Law, Finance, and Culture
Can and Cannot Explain About University Endowments in Financial Crisis (Summer 2009),
http://works.bepress.com/peter-conti-brown/i.
66. See generally Sarah E. Waldeck, Coming Showdown over University Endowments:
Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1795 (2009).
67. See Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Endowments May Help Rein in Tuition
Hikes (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel
_dataPagelD_ 502=14508.
68. See Conti-Brown, supra note 65, at 2-3.
69. Internal Revenue Code § 4942 imposes an excise tax on private foundations that fail
to distribute a required minimum. I.R.C. § 4942(a) (2006).
70. See generally Alan Finder, Yale Plans to Increase Spending from Its Endowment,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/education/08yale.html.
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galleries associated with universities,7' and the law is unclear. Because so
many universities have museums, they are an important repository of art
and objects, and it is important that the status of those collections and the
universities' responsibilities with respect to them be clear. There is enough
art owned by universities to consider that the legal obligations might be
defined uniquely for university-owned collections. The motto of the
Association of College and University Museums and Galleries is: "Great
Universities and Colleges Have Great Museums., 72 While it seems the
motto is true, in at least some cases, it is not self-evident why it is and
whether it should be.
The current pattern is predictable, though clearly undesirable: an
educational institution decides to sell art, it gets pilloried in the media,
people who may or may not have legal standing go to court,73 and everyone
spends a lot of money on lawyers. Unfortunately, there is precious little law
produced by this process to guide the behavior of university trustees and
their challengers. Settlements can reduce costs for the parties, but the
charitable community is then deprived of the benefit of clarification in the
law. There are not even norms recognizing that universities have a special
role in the art-deaccessioning debate. The public debate about
deaccessioning assumes that it is a conflict concerning only museums.
While emotions may run too high when a deaccessioning issue
arises,74 the problem seems to be a legal one: a university cannot be sure
that its decision to sell some (or all) of the university's art collection will
withstand legal challenge. The university cannot even predict who will be
allowed to oppose its decision, and there is no reason to believe that courts
will settle this issue any time soon. Courts will be involved where there are
restrictions attached to particular pieces of art and cy pres proceedings are
required; 75 but even there, institutions cannot be confident that unknown
challengers will not intervene on a motion to the court. While courts might
be the best institutional choice for resolving the issue, they have little
71. There are over 2000 participants in the Association of College & University
Museums & Galleries (ACUMG) listserv. See David Robertson, Association of College &
University Museums & Galeries, A Case for Membership, http://www.acumg.org/
memberopps.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
72. ACUMG, About ACUMG, Mission Statement, http://www.acumg.org/mission_
statement.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
73. Strict application of standing rules could be the most important mechanism for
controlling anti-deaccessioning litigation. Unfortunately, legal proceedings can consume
significant resources even if they are ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.
74. The attempt to protect The Gross Clinic under Philadelphia's historic-preservation
statute can only be explained by too much excitement.
75. See, e.g., Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-
COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009).
[Vol. 44:541
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opportunity to comprehensively address it. Consequently, legislation may
be necessary to create the proper standard for deaccessioning decisions,
without resort to litigation in every case. There must be a better procedure
for determining whether the Rose may close than slogging it out in court
for the next decade.
B. Theoretical Source of the Struggle over University Art
Collections
The practical explanations for the university-deaccessioning trend do
not reach the source of the problem, and focusing on the market value of art
and the financial troubles of universities will not produce lasting solutions.
The problem can only be addressed by grappling with the underlying
conflict, which is one of inconsistent conceptualization. The universities
that have turned to their art collections as resources, and the critics who
have attacked them for it, lack a common understanding of the nature of the
public interest in those art collections and the role of the collections in the
charitable mission of educational institutions. On account of those
inconsistent perspectives, they disagree about the obligations of the trustees
who oversee those institutions. The critics of university deaccessioning fail
to distinguish museums from other institutions that own art-but are not
primarily museums-because their approach to the issue is defined by the
fact that it concerns art. To the contrary, universities attempting to sell art
approach the issue from the perspective of their complex educational
responsibilities. While art remains the subject of every deaccessioning case,
this Article argues that is not the determinative legal factor. Because the
question is one of mission implementation, the differences among
institutions may justify different obligations with respect to the same
subject. The public interest carried out by universities on the one hand, and
museums on the other, diverge enough to justify one perspective on art
collections for museums and another for universities. Those differing
perspectives should justify different deaccessioning standards for museums
and universities. This contextual approach to art collections is consistent
with the private property approach, which imposes no obligation to protect,
display, or lend to museums or private owners of art, simply because they
are private owners rather than public or charitable institutions.
There are two distinct ways to conceptualize the art that institutions
hold. Both are legitimate and both can apply at the same time to the same
art. The first concept is art as "cultural property. 76 In the cultural property
conceptualization, there is something important about art to society that
76. See John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, the Public Interest, and
Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477, 479-81 (2003) (arguing that
the Barnes Collection is cultural property).
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imbues it with a common interest, whether it is owned by the government,
private institutions, or even individuals." The key aspect of
conceptualizing art as cultural property for purposes of thinking about the
obligations of art-holding institutions is that the art is valuable in itself,
regardless of its instrumental value,78 and that holding the art is itself
fulfillment of charitable purposes. 79 All works of art are held in a kind of
public trust.8°
An alternative to the cultural property conceptualization is what I will
call the "instrumental property" perspective. Unlike art as cultural property,
this conceptualization resists treating art as a unique asset. Instead, the art
is related to the mission of the organization because it enables the
organization to carry out its charitable purpose.81 Instrumental property has
a meaningful legal status only because it is held by a nonprofit
organization. Compared to cultural property, there is nothing inherently
worthy of legal protection in instrumental assets. Rather, their legal
importance derives from their context. All the conventional assets that
charities own are generally instrumental property, whether those assets are
part of the institution's endowment or part of the program assets used in
operating the charitable activities. Nevertheless, charitable trustees have
obligations with respect to both endowment assets and program assets.
C. The Consequences of Conceptualization as Cultural Property or
Instrumental Property
The legal consequences that flow from the cultural
property/instrumental property conceptualizations may conflict, with
cultural property demanding greater protection than instrumental property.
In disputes over deaccessioning, the two models might explain the
divergent positions because anti-deaccessionists elevate continued public
access to art above all other interests, in keeping with the common
77. See id. at 487 (arguing that because the Barnes Collection was public art "there is a
legitimate public interest in its management and preservation which, in turn, justifies public
intervention when that management goes bad or that preservation is threatened").
78. Id. at 480 ("The Barnes Collection as an ensemble has a public value that transcends
the value of its constituent parts.").
79. See INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS 2.0, at 3
(2006), available at http://icom.museum/ethics.html ("Museums have the duty to acquire,
preserve and promote their collections as a contribution to safeguarding the natural, cultural
and scientific heritage.").
80. Id.
81. See generally Jennifer L. White, Note, When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-
Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum
Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1041 (1996) (proposing a trust model for fiduciary
duties in deaccessioning art to accommodate the public interest in art).
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patrimony perspective of cultural property. Adherents to an instrumental
property approach can tolerate greater uncertainty regarding public access
in deaccessioned works in order to carry out other charitable purposes that
they perceive as equally compelling, for which there is no room in the
cultural property approach. If understood as cultural property, art is unique
among the assets that institutions own. 82 Cultural property classification
reflects an inherent public interest in the objects themselves, and the
government is justified in regulating and protecting them.83 This is the
model underlying laws that treat antiquities as government property.84
The cultural property perspective as applied to art implies a particular
basis for tax exemption: furthering that public trust by protecting and
maintaining cultural property should constitute a sufficient public benefit to
qualify the organization as charitable under Code § 501(c)(3). This is not
the approach generally taken by institutions that hold art, even museums.
Under current practice, museums are generally exempt as educational
organizations. 85 Educational charities serve people, rather than objects, and
the regulations define "educational" as "instruction of the public on
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." 86
Adoption of the cultural property conceptualization of art means that
museums could be "charitable" even if they serve no educational function.
Museums do not need to be educational to qualify for tax exemption
because the regulations define "charitable" to include "maintenance of
public buildings, monuments or works. 87 Art as cultural property seems to
fit nicely within that definition. It would not be unreasonable for museums
to conceptualize art this way and for them to define their missions in terms
of the stewardship of the cultural property they hold.88
82. See Hector Feliciano, Owen Pell & Nick Goodman, Nazi Gold and Other Assets of
the Holocaust: The Search for Justice, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 67, 72 (1998) ("Art is unique
and can often be distinguished from other assets.").
83. See Nivala, supra note 76, at 542 ("We have come to recognize that government
should act to preserve our cultural inheritance while acknowledging that such action
requires explicit protection of both the private owner's and the public's interests.").
84. See Christopher D. Cutting, Comment, Protecting Cultural Property Through
Provenance, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 943, 950 (2009) ("The United States' first law aimed at
the protection of cultural property was the Antiquities Act of 1906.").
85. See A COMPANION TO MUSEUM STUDIES 443 (Sharon Macdonald ed., 2006) ("The
tax code requires that charitable organizations serve a public purpose. In the case of
museums this is an educational... purpose.").
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (2009).
87. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2).
88. See, e.g., Guggenheim, Mission Statement, http://www.guggenheim.org/
guggenheim-foundation/mission-statement (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (defining their
mission in part as "to collect, conserve, and study the art of our time").
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The most vocal opponents of deaccessioning seem to adopt this
cultural property conception and therefore fail to distinguish among types
of institutions. Lee Rosenbaum argues that art is placed in museums for
"the collective cultural patrimony of the people who live in this country.
They are not fungible assets. ' 9 Others claim that "[t]he institution is there
to safeguard the art. The art is not there to support the institution. '" 90 In New
York, a bill was introduced in the legislature last year that would restrict
the circumstances under which any museum (and some other non-museum
nonprofit institutions) may sell their art.9' This reflects a strong notion of
art as cultural property, very far on the spectrum towards public control and
away from the private discretion that flows from the law of private
property.
The demands that cultural property characterization places on holders
of that property are unusual in the legal regime. Generally, the law in this
country does not reflect strong notions of public rights in art owned
privately--either by individuals, for-profit, or nonprofit institutions.
92
Private property rights predominate. Some states, like California, have
passed legislation that protects non-owner rights in art,9 3 and the federal
government has adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).94 But the
legislation in this country seems to be more about the rights of artists than
creating public rights in the art.95 Compared to European countries, the
recognized "moral rights" in art are quite limited in the United States.96
We can imagine a spectrum of regulation relating to art from strictly
protecting it as cultural property at one end, to the other extreme of not
89. Lee Rosenbaum, He's a Museum Leader for These Troubled Times, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 2009, at D7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123301149409717313
.html.
90. Jim Zarroli, Museums Exhibit Signs of Economic Distress, NPR, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99017732.
91. See A. 6959, 2009-2010 Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://public
.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi.; Robin Pogrebin, Institutions Try to Slow Bill to Curb
Sales of Art, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2009, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/23/arts/design/23deaccess.html.
92. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 21 (1999) ("Until quite
recently, it would have been correct to assume a total absence of restriction on owners [of
art], at least in America.").
93. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 2007).
94. Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 0128 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)).
95. SAX, supra note 92, at 22 ("[T]he law was protecting the art, even if only in the
name of protecting the artist.").
96. Id. at 21 ("While... France took the view that artists have an interest in works they
create, known as droit moral, the United States had resolutely rejected even that limitation
on owner autonomy.").
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recognizing anything special about art at all. While the cultural property
model resonates, it ultimately fails to define the way people generally
understand art. Therefore it is unsurprising that the law has failed to
develop robust rights for either artists or the community vis-A-vis owners of
art. Even though the public might recognize a shared loss in the destruction
of a great work of art, the American culture of private property resists
substantial legal demands on anyone who owns art. For art owned by
private individuals (and business corporations), rejection of the cultural
property perspective correspondingly strengthens ownership claims.
The uproar over decisions by universities reflects greater public
interest in the nonprofit sector than the private sector even though
charitable institutions are private organizations, albeit ones with public-
oriented goals. The issue of categorization and its consequences for
nonprofit organizations maps onto the more familiar debate about the
public versus private nature of such institutions. 97 An organization may
have a public function that supports cultural property characterization for
the property it holds. But charities are not homogeneous, and they are
essentially private organizations with public missions, so the private
property model is an appropriate starting point for analyzing them.
However, for art owned by nonprofit organizations, rejection of the strict
cultural property perspective is just a first step toward defining obligations.
If art is an instrumental asset to an institution, then it still needs to be
further categorized within the conventional taxonomy for assets owned by
nonprofits-endowment assets and program assets. Characterization as an
endowment or program asset will determine the content of the governing
board's obligations with respect to the property.
II. Context Should Determine Category.
A. Cultural Property Is for Museums.
The roles of art collections in the charitable missions of different
institutions need not be, and should not be, uniform. The cultural property
perspective and its focus on objects is only appropriate for institutions that
have missions directly related to art preservation and stewardship, i.e.
museums. This is because the nature of the institution and its mission-
rather than the nature of the property-should determine the proper
conceptualization along the spectrum from cultural property to instrumental
property. As a consequence, the obligations of different institutions should
97. See generally EVELYN BRODY & JOHN E. TYLER III, How PUBLIC Is PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY? (Suzanne Garment ed. 2009) (examining the major claims for greater
public control of charities), available at http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/files/Public
Private%20Monograph-high%20resFinal.pdf.
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appropriately vary according to their places on that spectrum. Because
universities have wide-ranging purposes beyond art preservation and
stewardship, universities need to conceptualize their art as largely
instrumental to their charitable missions and not primarily as cultural
property.
Finding the right balance on the spectrum is complex for institutions
that are not museums. The mission of museums is relatively narrow
compared to the mission of universities. Because of their sharper focus, it
makes sense for museums to conceptualize their collections more in terms
of cultural property than instrumental property and self-select into
demanding requirements for preservation and presentation. Members of the
American Association of Museums (AAM) and the Association of Art
Museum Directors (AAMD) seem to have done this by accepting strict
deaccessioning standards as conditions of membership. Consider the
following reflection of a cultural property approach from the AAM Code of
Ethics:
The distinctive character of museum ethics derives from the
ownership, care, and use of objects, specimens, and living
collections representing the world's natural and cultural common
wealth. This stewardship of collections entails the highest public
trust and carries with it the presumption of rightful ownership,
permanence, care, documentation, accessibility, and responsible
disposal.
98
The AAMD, a more exclusive club99 than the AAM with just 193
members, 00 has the strictest deaccessioning policy: "Proceeds from a
deaccessioned work are used only to acquire other works of art-the
proceeds are never used as operating funds, to build a general endowment,
or for any other expenses." 10 1 This policy is consistent with a strong
cultural property perspective because rules against deaccessioning resist
treating art as a fungible asset. If the object's preservation is the objective
98. American Association of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums, http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfin (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter AAM,
Code of Ethics].
99. Association of Art Museum Directors, About AAMD, http://www.aamd.org/about/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter About AAMD). Only large institutions are eligible
for membership in the AAMD because of its budget requirements, which require a
professional staff and an annual operating budget equivalent to or exceeding $2 million for
two consecutive years. Id.
100. Id.
101. ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS AND THE PRACTICE OF
DEACCESSIONING 1 (2007), http://aamd.org/papers/documents/FINALPositionPaperDeacces
sioning.doc [hereinafter DEACCESSIONING].
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of the institution, the object can never be sold to achieve another purpose.
This is the burden of great museums.
B. University Art Collections Are Hybrid Cultural and Instrumental
Property.
Universities have a harder task than museums in conceptualizing their
art collections because they must determine what role the art plays in an
institution's mission where, by definition, it is not the central focus.
Universities must weigh science labs against athletic facilities against
financial aid. The cuts in programs and personnel that universities have
suffered highlights the problem of incommensurable trade-offs that
universities face. 0 2 The art collection should not be immune from
compromises, unless the art itself is unique or the art is functionally
indispensible to the organization. Universities focused on their educational
missions might decide that art education requires museum stewardship, but
it would be a mistake to assume that universities need to own art in order
for students to have access to art and art education.
A hybrid model that incorporates the perspectives of both cultural
property and instrumental property, with a greater emphasis on the
instrumental, best reflects the charitable mission for universities. University
purposes are varied and complex; trustees need to exercise a high degree of
judgment and compromise among competing objectives is unavoidable.
University trustees need to understand the role that art plays in their
educational mission and behave responsibly within that constraint.
Sometimes that will mean sacrificing other interests for maintenance and
preservation of an art collection, but in some cases, particularly for schools
with severe financial troubles, deaccessioning may be a responsible
decision.
Consider the case of the New York Public Library. Although it is not
a university, like universities, it is an institution with a core mission, which
an art collection is clearly related to, but is not central to. It has long owned
some high-quality art. 03 During the period that the universities described at
the beginning of this Article thought it would be advantageous to sell
artwork, the Library came to the same judgment about an Asher Durand
painting that it owned. Despite media attacks, it sold Kindred Spirits to the
Crystal Bridges Museum for $35 million. It had decided that, as a library,
rather than keep the painting, it would be better to devote the money it
could raise from its sale to create an endowment to acquire library research
102. See Responses to the Downturn: A Survey of Colleges, supra note 64, at A14.
103. See New York Public Library, Collections: The Heart of the Library, http://www.
nypl.org/help/about-nypl/collections (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) ("[U]nique among the
NYPL's libraries, it actively collects art as part of its mission .... ").
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materials.' °4 Its trustees determined that the institution was not primarily a
museum and that it was more important to devote its resources to core
library collections. 10 5 The Library's behavior reflects a hybrid property
approach because the trustees recognized that the painting was a special
object requiring extra careful consideration in its disposition. Respecting
the cultural property aspects, the purchaser was a museum that will
continue to provide access to the public and protection of the object.
Reflecting the instrumental property aspects, the trustees treated the
painting as a valuable commodity worth selling to enable the organization
to invest in other assets that the trustees considered more relevant.
C. Legal Ramifications of Classification as Instrumental Assets
In addition to adopting elements of the cultural property model, the
hybrid model incorporates the multi-faceted nature of instrumental
property. Thus, decisions about art collections owned by universities must
reflect both the special nature of art and the specific function of the
collection within the university's set of resources. The category of
instrumental assets encompasses a variety of resources that are not always
clearly distinguished from one another. When art collections function as
instrumental assets, they need to be divided into three further classes-
endowment assets, program-related assets, and liabilities-in order to
investigate the legal regime that should control the obligations with respect
to the collections.
Charitable organizations are generally aware of the difference
between their endowment assets and their program-related operating assets.
Endowments are committed to investments that provide income to fund
current expenses. They also represent a store of wealth that an organization
might partially liquidate in challenging financial periods, but are generally
considered permanent. Program-related assets are property that an
organization uses to carry out its charitable activities. They can be valuable
and long-lived assets, like buildings in which the organization runs its
programs, but they are program-related because they are used in operations
and not because they constitute financial resources. Program assets are
different from endowments; they are used, rather than preserved.
Institutions do not always think of their valuable assets as possible
liabilities as well, but they are well aware of the continuing costs incurred
in maintaining more assets, whether endowment or program-related. For
example, program-related buildings demand a steady stream of funds for
104. See also Carol Vogel, New York Public Library to Sell Major Artworks to Raise
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005
/04/1 I/arts/design/i Ilibr.html.
105. See id.
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upkeep, imposing substantial increased costs on institutions that expand
their physical plant, even when the construction has been fully funded.
When owned by universities, art collections resemble all three of
these categories, often simultaneously. They resemble portfolio
endowments because they constitute valuable assets owned by an
organization that are not used up in the course of operations over time. Art
collections also need to be protected from loss and waste, just like financial
endowments. Pursuant to state statutes governing endowment assets,
institutions are obligated to manage endowments with a view towards
preservation for permanent duration, 10 6 which is how art needs to be
maintained. At the same time, art collections resemble endowment assets
because of their potential liquidity.'0 7 Unlike the buildings in which a
university operates its educational program, its art collection is movable
and composed of multiple pieces that can be sold individually. Like the
market for portfolio investments, there is a relatively liquid market in art;
auction houses and private dealers make the sale of valuable art easy and
efficient. Finally, the prices of art in the market as a whole have exceeded
any reasonable range for consumer assets; on account of their extremely
high values, art collections must be understood as investment assets,
regardless of who owns them. Despite the stories at the beginning of this
Article, art collections, similar to endowments, constitute a stock of wealth
that organizations generally do not liquidate. 0 8 The issue is as contentious
as it is because deaccessioning for operating funds is rare, and the
announcement that Brandeis made concerning the Rose Museum is
unprecedented. These cases are important because they are a departure
from the norm and therefore challenge the assumptions people have about
art collections owned by universities.
Art collections resemble program assets because they are used in
carrying out the mission of the organization. °9 For universities, they are
one among many assets that promote educational purposes-they are an
important tool for students learning about art and a great resource for
106. See UNiF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDs ACT § 4 (1972).
107. Auction houses exist for this precise purpose. They even have special departments
for museums interested in buying and selling. See, e.g., Christie's Museum Services,
http://www.christies.com/services/museum (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
108. See White, supra note 81, at 1041 ("Art museums present the paradox of being
simultaneously very rich, because of the value of the assets they hold, and very poor, due to
the illiquidity of those assets .... ").
109. See, e.g., Rose Art Museum, Mission Statement, http://www.brandeis.edu/rose/
aboutus/mission.htmI (last visited April 15, 2010) ("The programs of the Rose adhere to the
overall mission of the University, embracing its values of academic excellence, social
justice, and freedom of expression.").
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scholarship by faculty and students."0° Like other program assets, they
cannot be outsourced to financial managers but must be managed by
charitable trustees and the officers and employees whom they supervise."'
Unlike pure investments, and more like special property devoted to
operations, the individual items in a collection are not fungible like
financial assets.
Finally, art is also a liability. Compared to financial endowments, art
is expensive to conserve, store and insure. In its petition for cy pres relief,
Fisk University represented that it would need $560,000 to restore the
gallery in which the Stieglitz Collection is displayed." 2 Restrictions that
require organizations to keep their art mandate that funds come from
elsewhere for these kinds of expenses. In this way, art resembles capital
improvements in operating assets, which permanently increase operating
costs. But unlike those improvements, these costs for art collections may
rival the benefits of those collections in the educational mission.
These three categories are important because they form the
foundation for the regulatory scheme. Each of these categories demands
different behavior from trustees, and the law governing behavior is
somewhat clearer once we get to the level of these categories. The problem
with university deaccessioning decisions stems from a lack of
conceptualization of art collections in charitable institutions, and the
consequent inability to map onto this set of rules. The law governing
trustee behavior assumes that we know which category a particular asset
falls, and the category determines the obligation. In this section, I consider
how classification of university art collections as endowment assets,
program-related assets, and liabilities might affect the legal rules applicable
to trustee decisions and the consequences for deaccessioning.
1. Endowment
If the art collection is characterized as an endowment asset, it must be
administered pursuant to the standards of "investment responsibility.
''13
Treating art collections as endowments would provide considerably more
110. See, e.g., id.
111. This is because the trustees are responsible for carrying out the charitable purposes
of the organization. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 320
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
112. In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-111, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008), rev'd
sub nom Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-R3-
CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009).
113. UNWF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6 cmt. (1972) ("The standard of
Section 6 was derived in part from Proposed Treasury Regulations § 53.4944-1(a)(2)
dealing with the investment responsibility of managers of private foundations.").
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certainty than categorizing them as program assets, liabilities, or cultural
property because endowments are subject to relatively specific statutory
rules about management, liquidation, and modification. Versions of the
uniform laws concerning management of institutional funds, Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) and Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA)," 4 have been adopted
across the country. 1 5 The statutory rules are based on managerial
"prudence" that seeks to preserve value for the institution.' 16 As a practical
consequence of applying these statutory standards, art collections subject to
the rules for endowments would not be easy to sell, but they would not be
impossible to sell either. Because of their conservative approach, applying
the endowment rules to art collections would not be a bad solution for
modulating the debate.
The rules for managing endowments under the uniform acts would
permit universities to invest in art as part of a diversified portfolio.
UPMIFA requires managers to consider total return from investments
including income and appreciation,1 7 suggesting that art, primarily on
account of its record as a good long-term investment, is a prudent
endowment asset. In addition, managers must consider an asset's special
relationship to the charitable purpose of the institution in making decisions
regarding endowment funds.11 8 That language suggests more permissive
investment in items like art that are useful in the charitable mission.
Appropriation from an endowment for expenditure-i.e., selling the
art-is also subject to a standard of prudence. For financial assets, the
standard suggests moderation, which is not immediately translatable to
investments in art. For works of art, there is no separable income to
withdraw for current use, and the appreciation cannot be extracted
separately from the capital. In this way, art collections fail to resemble
some, but not all, endowment assets. Even for some strictly financial assets,
holders cannot sell a part of an investment that has appreciated in value.
114. See generally UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT.
OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006).
115. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note ("[Forty-
Seven] jurisdictions have enacted [UMIFA]."); Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds
Act, Enactment Status Map, http://upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid
=68 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (showing forty-four states have enacted UPMIFA).
116. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note ("The
prudence standards in UMIFA have provided useful guidance, but prudence norms evolve
over time. The new Act [,UPMIFA,] provides modem articulations of the prudence
standards for the management and investment of charitable funds and for endowment
spending.").
117. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(1)(E).
118. Id.
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Thus, the question under the legal standard becomes how to liquidate the
return consistent with the required prudence.
Under UMIFA, endowment funds can be withdrawn to the extent that
the fund currently exceeds its "historic dollar value" (HDV), which is
defined as the value of contributions to the fund. 119 If art was acquired by
an institution a long time ago, the HDV is likely to be significantly below
the current fair market value, suggesting discretion for trustees to
appropriate some amount for expenditure. However, the inseparable nature
of art objects pose a problem depending on whether all of a university's art
is considered a single fund, or whether each individual artwork constitutes
its own fund. If each work of art is a separate fund, then no sale is possible
under UMIFA because every sale will, by definition, eat into the HDV. But
if the entire collection of art is treated as a fund, or the fund consists of art
and other assets, then the HDV limitation is unlikely to restrict sales. While
the shortcomings of the HDV benchmark are widely acknowledged, 120 its
application to an art collection in these two alternative ways suggests a
particularly arbitrary determination of prudence.
Most states no longer use HDV because they have adopted the revised
version of the uniform law, which rejects the HDV concept. Under
UPMIFA, prudence in appropriation for expenditure depends on a more
contextual analysis in place of HDV, so trustees must consider the factors
listed in the statute in any individual sale, but there are no bright-line
limits. 12' The core premise is that trustees must approach spending
decisions with a view towards preserving the endowment; consideration of
the duration and preservation of the fund is the first factor, among many, to
be considered in appropriation decisions. 
122
Art collections present an interesting case for the "preservation"
imperative because preservation of art differs from preservation of other
assets. Preserving financial endowments is about preventing losses in value
suffered by the institution, but preserving art can concern the objects
themselves in addition to their value to the institution holding them. Some
institutions have trouble preventing the art objects in their care from
deteriorating, which reflects a preservation problem in both respects. This
was true in Fisk's stewardship of the Stieglitz Collection. 123 During her
119. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2 (1972).
120. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note,
Endowment Spending ("UPMIFA improves the endowment spending rule by eliminating
the concept of historic dollar value ....").
121. See UNIw. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 4(a)(1)-(7).
122. Id.
123. See Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-
R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009) ("These
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lifetime, O'Keeffe expressed concern with the conditions under which the
works were housed at the University. 124 She offered to find them a better
home, in spite of the fact that she had no right to take the works back
because the gifts were complete.1 25 A claim of imprudence under UPMIFA
might be compelling where an institution is unable to properly maintain its
collection because it then wastes the value of its assets. In such a
circumstance, it might be required, as the prudent course of action, for the
institution to divest itself of the collection and replace it with something
(like financial assets) that it is better able to preserve.
The objective of endowment preservation distinguishes situations in
which universities sell art to pay the bills, and situations in which they sell
art to bolster their endowment of financial assets. Institutions like Randolph
and Fisk that plan to devote the proceeds of their art sales to their
endowments126 should easily satisfy the UPMIFA prudence standard
because they were not, in fact, appropriating for expenditure but were
rather changing the composition of the assets in their endowment portfolio.
Finally, another factor for trustees to consider in deciding what is prudent
to appropriate for expenditure is "the purposes of the institution and the
endowment fund."'127 The distinction between museums and universities
might make a significant difference under this factor.
In addition to the rules for managing and appropriating from
endowments, the investment responsibility rules include standards
governing modifications of restrictions contained in gift instruments.
Application of these rules to art collections could provide some needed
clarity. Under the rules for endowments, the intent of the donor expressed
in the gift instrument is a limitation on the fund, and institutions must seek
court approval for any modifications to the terms of the gift.'28 Court
proceedings are necessary for institutions to sell art when the gift
instrument restricts sales. Both Fisk University and Randolph College
initiated court proceedings because the works they wanted to sell were gifts
subject to restrictions (which may have affected their ability to sell).'29 If
proceedings began when Fisk University . . . could no longer afford to maintain the
collection pursuant to the conditions imposed [fifty] years earlier.").
124. Id. at *31-34.
125. Id. at *32-33.
126. See supra Part I.
127. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4(a)(2).
128. Id. § 6(b).
129. In Randolph College, the art itself was not gifted, but the fund from which the art
was purchased was a restricted fund. Depending on interpretation, the sale of the works may
not have been restricted under the terms of the gift. See Complaint, supra note 28, at 2
(providing the will of a trustee which directed that the money she gave to Randolph was
only to be used "to form a permanent collection of art").
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the endowment statutes were clearly applicable in those cases, courts might
be more amenable to the institutions attempting to sell art because
UPMIFA has more generous modification provisions than its predecessor
or the common law: it allows cy pres modifications for wasteful
restrictions, in addition to unlawful, impracticable, and impossible
purposes. 30 Fisk argued that maintenance of the collection was a drain on
its other resources and that a sale of some of the collection would finance
renovation of the gallery in which it was displayed. 131 Application of the
endowment rules might have led the trial court in Fisk to weigh the
interests before it differently, with greater attention to the financial
demands that the collection imposed on the school. It could have ruled for
the University on the grounds that the restrictions in the gift operated to
waste the University's other assets because the collection was not
sufficiently endowed with money to support itself over time.
Applying the endowment rules to university art collections would
have efficiency advantages because those rules would then provide a
default against which donors and institutions could contract. A UPMIFA
default might also give institutions some sorely needed leverage in their
negotiations with donors because it contemplates modifications on
wastefulness, which might encourage greater underwriting of restricted
gifts. Under current law, there is no clear benchmark against which
institutions and donors can begin negotiating gift restrictions.
Consequently, restricted-gift contracts are more cumbersome to draft and to
litigate than they might otherwise be.
The most important consequence of applying the endowment
modification rules to art collections is that the regime would make clear
that there is no need for court approval where there are no restrictions.
Heirs of donors and other opponents of deaccessioning would like to see
courts impose restrictions on art sales even where there is no restriction in
the gift instrument. Treatment under the endowment rules would clarify
when a modification is necessary at all. For example, the art involved in the
Rose Museum dispute was generally not subject to donor-imposed
restrictions, and Brandeis did not initiate a court proceeding prior to
announcing its decision to deaccession. 132 Nevertheless, others hauled the
University into court as though the default rule prohibited Brandeis's
130. UN1F. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c). UMIFA, however, only
allows the governing board to go around donor restrictions "[i]f written consent of the donor
cannot be obtained by reason of his death, disability, unavailability, or impossibility of
identification." UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(b).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 13-27.
132. See Daniel Grant, The Brandeis Bombshell: Is the University's Museum Just a Rose
to Be Plucked?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at D7 ("Restrictions on gifts to the Rose Art
Museum tend to be very few.... ").
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deaccessioning. 133 Because Massachusetts's version of UPMIFA (adopted
after the trustees announced the decision, but before any art was actually
sold) 134 is not clearly the governing law in this situation, the standard that
will be applied to Brandeis, if it pursues the sale and the suit continues, is
unclear. Much of the art owned by universities is not subject to
restrictions, 35 and where that is the case, if the investment-responsibility
rules control, the trustees would be governed by the prudence standard-
rather than the more demanding modification rules-in deciding how to
manage and whether to spend from the fund.
2. Program-Related Assets
If art collections are classified as program-related assets, the
applicable legal rules consist of the fiduciary duties of charitable directors:
care, loyalty, and obedience. These rules are characterized by significant
discretion for trustees and protection of the best-judgment rule 136 for
decisions concerning operation of the organization's program. 37 The best-
judgment rule protects trustees from challenges to their decision, as long as
those decisions were made with sufficient inquiry and without conflicts of
interest. In this category, we should have less court involvement than in
decisions regarding endowments on account of the room trustees have for
exercising directorial judgment. The investment responsibility rules
applicable to endowments create obligations that can be enforced in
court, 138 but in this category, courts refrain from acting as super-trustees in
cases in which they are called upon to second-guess the wisdom of trustee
decisions.
139
133. See Abramson, supra note 6.
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180A, § 11 (1975) (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
180A, § 1 (2009)).
135. See Howards, supra note 1, at 11 ("Most artworks are given as unrestricted gifts ...
136. This is a variant of the business judgment rule. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) ("The business judgment rule ... is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.").
137. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 111, § 365.
138. See Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
(holding that trustees breached the prudent man rule by failing to invest income over a five-
year period).
139. See Fleck v. Cent. Steel & Wire Co., No. 92-C-7988, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5951,
at *8 (N.D. I11. Apr. 30, 1993) ("This Court does not sit as a super-administrator or a super-
Trustee ...rather the role of this Court is limited to determining the rationality of the
Trustees' decision and the absence of bad faith on their part.").
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Best-judgment rule protection does not imply unlimited power.,40
Under the fiduciary-duty standard, trustee discretion is limited by gross
negligence (or simple negligence, if organized as a trust) and conflict of
interest rules.11 Thus, applying the fiduciary standards to university
trustees making deaccessioning decisions allows exercise of judgment
regarding the best interests of the institution but not unreviewable freedom.
In fact, the duty of care demands careful consideration of a decision to sell
an artwork long associated with the institution. Closing a university's
museum and selling all the art demands careful study. Massachusetts's
Attorney General was justified in getting involved in the Rose Museum
transaction, and the Brandeis decision may have been deficient under a
straightforward fiduciary-duty analysis. Consider the following excerpt
from a letter to the Brandeis community from its own Department of Fine
Arts:
Late Monday afternoon (January 26) the Department of Fine
Arts was notified that the University Board of Trustees resolved
to disband the Rose Art Museum and sell the collection at
auction to raise funds for the university. In addition to despairing
at the Trustees' action, we wish to make clear that at no point in
the decision making process was the Department of Fine Arts
faculty consulted. Neither was there any communication
regarding the decision with the Rose Board of Overseers on
which a member of the faculty sits. Nor was any reference made
to the museum at the university-wide faculty meeting last
Thursday (January 22) when strategies to confront the current
fiscal crisis were discussed. 1
42
How would an attorney general analyze the trustees' action if this
were the description of how the university handled the sale of some very
valuable scientific equipment, for example, instead of the Rose Museum
collection? Governance questions would arise, even though the sale
concerned wholly program-related assets without any special status under
the law. If the trustees determined that the university already owned
enough of that type of equipment, or if the only faculty member who knew
how to use the equipment retired, or if there were not enough students
140. See Lynch, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 92 ("[Tlhe directors failed to meet the standards of the
prudent man investment rule. . . none of the circumstances exonerate them from liability.").
141. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381
F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) ("[A] director must often have committed 'gross
negligence' or otherwise be guilty of more than mere mistakes of judgment.").
142. Christopher Howard, Brandeis Department of Fine Arts Responds to Museum
Closing, COLL. ARTs Ass'N NEWS, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.collegeart.org/news/2009/02
/03/brandeis-department-of-fine-arts-responds-to-museum-closing/.
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interested in the field of study that made the equipment necessary, the
trustees might have decided that it was not worth keeping, insuring and
maintaining. Some people would be upset, of course, because a major
might be discontinued, or a lab might have to close, and it might have been
shortsighted for the trustees to sell. But under the best-judgment rule, even
foolish decisions are protected from challenge in court if they are made
after proper deliberation with sufficient information and no conflict of
interest. 143 Given the precipitous dip in the art market that occurred at the
time that Brandeis announced its decision, a sale at that moment might
have seemed foolish, but mere foolishness is not a fiduciary-duty
violation. 1
44
The problem that the Fine Arts Department's letter raises about the
Rose decision was that the trustees apparently made it without a full and
fair consideration of the costs and benefits of deciding to close the
museum. Without the views of the fine arts faculty and the Rose Board of
Overseers, the trustees may have underestimated the important
contributions of the Rose to the Brandeis mission. How could the trustees
decide whether the museum was an important part of the mission without
consulting the people who knew what the role of the museum was in both
the educational program (the fine arts faculty) and in the University's
fundraising (the Rose board)? Even without any special limitation on the
sale of art by institutions, the trustees' actions may have been grossly
negligent and in violation of the duty of care. 145 In this case, it is
appropriate for the Attorney General to prevent the sale, but that does not
imply that it is always a violation of fiduciary duty to deaccession art
holdings.
The solution to this problem is process, which is the solution of
choice in questions of care. In the Sibley Hospital case, the leading case on
the duty of care in nonprofit corporation law, the court imposed policies
143. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984) (explaining business
judgment rule); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (I11. App. Ct. 1968) (refusing to
second-guess questionable business decision made by directors); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 111, § 365.
144. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[The
business judgment rule] provides that where a director is independent and disinterested,
there can be no liability for corporate loss, unless the facts are such that no person could
possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their
duty.").
145. "The duty of care requires each governing-board member-(a) to become
appropriately informed about issues requiring consideration, and to devote appropriate
attention to oversight; and (b) to act with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 111, § 315.
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and procedures on the organization to ensure that sufficient investigation
and deliberation would take place. 146 Where art is concerned, sufficient
process is particularly important because it can guarantee that the cultural
property aspect of the property receives some consideration in the decision.
The best way to accommodate both the cultural property concerns and the
program objectives of an organization is through enhanced process, which
is in keeping with the direction of nonprofit fiduciary duty law generally.
The problem with deaccessioning decisions where art collections are
program-related assets goes beyond fiduciary duties. Public criticism of the
Brandeis trustees' decision was not based on the trustees' failure to
exercise care, but on the University's failure to adhere to museum
expectations of behavior. Industry standards may apply when program
assets are at issue, and the AAMD and AAM both have demanding
standards for deaccessioning.147 For member museums, selling art for
operating funds is cause for loss of accreditation and censure by the
industry organizations. 48 In a position paper published by the AAMD, the
standard is unequivocal: "Proceeds from a deaccessioned work are used
only to acquire other works of art-the proceeds are never used as
operating funds, to build a general endowment, or for any other
expenses.'' 149 In a similar vein, AAM's Code of Ethics for Museums
requires that "[p]roceeds from the sale of nonliving collections are to be
used consistent with the established standards of the museum's discipline,
but in no event shall they be used for anything other than acquisition or
direct care of collection.' 150 Director members of the AAMD and museums
that are members of the AAM have represented to the world that they
intend to abide by the deaccession policies of the associations by dint of
their membership.
However, it would be a mistake to impose industry standards as the
legal benchmark, particularly to institutions that are not primarily
participants in the industry. The Rose was not a member of these
organizations, so they had no jurisdiction over it.1 5 1 Nevertheless, Ford W.
146. See Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1018.
147. See DEACCESSIONING, supra note 101.
148. See Press Release, Association of Art Museum Directors, AAMD San Diego
Meeting Featured Lively Discussion of Current Issues Affecting America's Art Museums
(Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.aamd.org/newsroomldocumentsl2009PostSanDiegoMeeting
PressReleaseFINAL.pdf ("When AAMD was informed that the National Academy had
violated the Association's prohibition against using funds from deaccessioning for
operations, AAMD censured and imposed sanctions on the National Academy.").
149. DEACCESSIONNG, supra note 101 (emphasis added).
150. AAM, Code of Ethics, supra note 98.
151. For the Rose Art Museum, and many other university-affiliated museums, the
standards of the AAM are not binding because university museums often fail to become
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Bell, President of AAM issued a statement condemning Brandeis for its
decision to close the Rose, claiming that "Brandeis University is in
fundamental violation of the public trust responsibilities it accepted the day
it founded the Rose Museum."' 52 The statement is most interesting for the
following final paragraph:
If it cannot afford to maintain and exhibit its collection, we urge
Brandeis University to seek another steward of it. There are
many fine museums in the region capable of caring for these
works, even on a temporary basis, while the university explores
other options. In choosing an alternate solution to the sale and
irrevocable loss of the collection that was entrusted to its care,
the university would serve as a role model for its students,
faculty and community. 1
53
This statement reveals the conflict that museum industry standards
can create for universities. Bell suggests that it would have been more
ethical for Brandeis to relocate the art to another museum in the area
without accounting for the interests of the University's educational
program in such a relocation. While the statement is not precise about what
it means to find another steward for the art, if the suggestion is that
Brandeis transfer the art to a Boston-area museum, the ethical demands of
the museum association undermine the fiduciary obligations of the
University trustees. Brandeis's trustees' central obligation is to the
educational mission of the University. If having the art on campus is a
necessary component of that mission, as some have argued,154 then moving
it to the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, for example, would not serve that
objective.
Bell's perspective, predictably, is the cultural property perspective of
museums, and not the more nuanced hybrid perspective that universities
need to have. As fiduciaries to a university, the central question for the
AAM members for reasons not connected to a desire to deaccession more freely. See Bd. &
Membership of the Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Museums & Galleries, Comments on Academic
Museums and the AAM Accreditation Process, 1, http://www.acumg.org/files/Comments_
onacademicmuseums and theAAMAccreditationprocess.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2010) ("[T]he vast majority of museums in the U.S. don't apply [to the AAM] for a variety
of reasons.").
152. Press Release, Am. Ass'n of Museums, AAM Statement on the Closure of the Rose
Museum at Brandeis Univ. (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.boston.com/ae/theater-arts/
exhibitionist/2009/01/aamcondemns br.html.
153. Id.
154. See Letter from Annette DiMeo Carlozzi, Curator of Am. & Contemporary Art and
Dir. of Curatorial Affairs, Blanton Museum of Art, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, to Brandeis
Univ., http://www.brandeis.edu/rose/letters.html ("An art museum is absolutely central to
the teaching mission of a liberal arts university.") (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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trustees is whether they have an obligation, in seeking another steward for
the art, to realize maximum value for the university in the process. Some
commentators have argued for a compromise in the deaccessioning debate
that would favor museum acquisition over private acquisition of
deaccessioned works. 155 While that compromise acknowledges the public
interest in access to art, it ignores the obligations that the selling
institution's trustees have to stewardship of that institution's resources.
One of the lessons of the lengthy litigation in the Fisk case is that museums
will try to acquire art at a discount from financially strapped universities.
The proposed settlement, under which Fisk would have sold Radiator
Building to the O'Keeffe Museum for $7 million, was rejected by the
Tennessee Attorney General because Fisk received other offers of up to
$25 million for the painting.156 A rule that favors museum purchasers over
sales to the highest bidder will operate as a wealth transfer from
universities to museums. Without a compelling reason why museums
deserve that transfer from universities, it seems to be a dubious rule. In
fiduciary-duty terms, it might be a waste of university assets for the
collection to be "cared for" by another institution or sold for significantly
less than its fair market value, when it could be a source of significant
revenue for the school. Waste of corporate assets is the one foolish action
that is not protected by the business judgment rule in the standard corporate
law context. 1
57
Rather than imposing industry standards on institutions that have not
chosen to be in the industry associations, it is better policy to have a variety
of standards for deaccessioning decisions. A different-lower-standard
for universities allows them to better serve their charitable purposes, but it
is also better for donors because it gives donors more specific choices. If
the rules are clear, then donors can select the standard they want. The
155. See Dobryzynski, supra note 12 (suggesting that museums be allowed to
deaccession works for operating funds, subject to the review of an impartial arbitrator, and
only if the work were offered to museums before going to public auction); see also White,
supra note 81, at 1063-64 ("Courts should encourage directors to use their best efforts to
facilitate a sale that is profitable and keeps the artwork available for public observation.").
156. See Jack B. Siegel, Another Painting, Another Day: Tennessee Attorney General
Stops Sale of O'Keeffe Painting by Fisk University, Leaving Controversy Unsolved,
CHARITY GOVERNANcE BLOG, Apr. 6, 2007, http://charitygovernance.blogs.com/charity
_governance/2007/04/anotherpaintin.html (linking to Press Release, Office of Att'y Gen.,
Attorney General declines to approve Fisk, Museum Settlement Agreement to Sell Prized
Paintings (Apr. 5, 2007), available at, http://charitygovemance.blogs.com/charity_
governance/files/TenAGPressRelease April_2007.pdf.
157. See Fogelson v. Am. Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1948) ("Courts are
properly reluctant to interfere with the business judgment of corporate directors; they do so
only if there has been so clear an abuse of discretion as to amount to legal waste.").
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possibility that a university museum may more easily sell paintings forces
donors to focus sharply on the nature of their charitable intent and decide
whether they are primarily interested in presenting the work in a particular
place or primarily interested in supporting the recipient institution.
Consider the Fisk dispute through this lens. If Georgia O'Keeffe were
alive, she probably would not oppose Fisk's decision to sell a partial
interest in the Stieglitz Collection to the Crystal Bridges Museum.
O'Keeffe's correspondence with Fisk indicated that she was concerned that
the collection receive proper care, 158 and Crystal Bridges will clearly satisfy
that interest, with state of the art facilities, programs, and conservation.' 59
As a cultural property, the collection will likely be seen and studied by
more people if the proposed sharing with Crystal Bridges is approved since
the museum will be a major cultural destination and an active participant in
inter-museum loans (it has already loaned its artworks to major
museums). 160 More importantly, O'Keeffe gave the collection to Fisk
because she cared about Fisk succeeding. Her intent was to improve Fisk's
position. Consider the trial court's finding about why O'Keeffe gave the
Stieglitz Collection to Fisk:
As to her reasons for gifting the Collection to Fisk, O'Keeffe
wrote "because I think it a good thing to do at this time and that
it would please Stieglitz."... Given the circumstances of this
time, O'Keeffe's statement makes clear that giving the gift to
Fisk was a "good thing" because it would send a message to
America that African Americans had much to offer and
contribute to society, just as whites did. This statement and
gesture about race, the Court finds, is Ms. O'Keeffe's motivation
for giving the donation to Fisk.
16 1
It was clear that O'Keeffe knew how to donate her works for
maximum preservation and exposure-the rest of the collection mostly
went to major museums.' 62 If a donor has valuable art to donate, she can
158. See Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-
R3-VC, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434, at *32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009).
159. See Crystal Bridges Museum of Am. Art, About Crystal Bridges, http://www.
crystalbridges.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) ("Visitors will be able to enjoy the
collection within the state-of-the-art galleries.").
160. See Crystal Bridges Museum of Am. Art, The Crystal Bridges Collection, http://
www.crystalbridges.org/collection (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (listing a number of museums
Crystal Bridges has loaned works to).
161. In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008), rev'd
sub nom Georgia O'Keeffe Found., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434.
162. See Fisk Univ., Collections, http://www.fisk.edu/CampusLife/FiskUniversity
Galleries/Collections.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (stating that the majority of the over
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decide to donate it to a university with a broad mission, or to a museum
that is a member of the AAM whose director is a member of the AAMD. If
the donor knows that the university is subject to a lower standard than the
museum for selling the painting for operating funds, she must decide if her
primary interest is enriching the university and improving its programs, or
preserving the painting permanently for educational purposes. -This is not
such a bad choice to impose on donors, but it is important that the choice
be clear.
Under current law, gifts of art are privileged, and tax law has
encouraged donors to give artworks 163 even where their primary motivation
is support of the university and not stewardship of the art. This is on
account of the fair market value deduction allowed for gifts of art that are
connected to the charitable mission of the recipient organization,' 64 a
standard that easily applies to museums and universities that have any art-
education programs. The donor may have been just as willing to give the
university cash, but the charitable deduction for a donation of art is likely
to be much more advantageous to the donor than a contribution of the art's
value in cash. 165 Although the consequences are substantial for individual
institutions involved, the public interest is served, albeit in different ways,
as long as one of the institutions receives the gift. If the public interest in
access to art is more important than education, the museum gift should be
favored compared to the university gift. But tax law reflects neutrality
between charitable purposes of universities and charitable purposes of
museums. If that is a desirable policy stance, then the cultural property
model must be rejected for universities, and art stewardship should not be
1000 pieces in the Stieglitz Collection went to six institutions: Fisk University, Metropolitan
Museum of Art, Art Institute of Chicago, National Gallery of Art, Philadelphia Museum of
Art, and the Library of Congress).
163. See Joy Gibney Berus, The Art of Donating Art: The Charitable Contribution ofArt,
Antiques and Collectibles, J. PRAc. EST. PLAN., April-May 2008, at 31, 31, available at
http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/the-art-donating-art-the-charitable-contribution-art-antiques-
and-collectibles ("U.S. tax laws provide an incentive for clients to contribute, during their
lifetime or upon their death, works of art to U.S. tax exempt organizations such as qualified
museums and universities.").
164. See Carolyn M. Osteen, Special Issues for Cultural Nonprofits, in 2 MASS.
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 18.5.1 (MCLE, Inc. rev. ed. 2004) ("A gift to a public charity of
tangible personal property... is deductible to the extent of the full fair market value of the
contributed property, only if it is 'reasonable to anticipate' that the charity will use the
property for some.., exempt purpose.") (citing I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1 70A-4(b)(3)(ii) (2009)).
165. See Berus, supra note 163, at 31-32 ("Donated property that is appreciated long-
term ... can be deducted at its full fair market value. On the other hand, the amount your
client can deduct for a contribution of ordinary income property is generally only the
client's basis in the property ... not the full fair market value.").
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privileged compared to other charitable functions. The contextual approach
to deaccessioning is consistent with tax law's neutrality among charitable
purposes.
3. Liabilities
The final category-liabilities-is the least recognized with respect to
art, for good reason. Even when collections impose significant costs on the
institutions that own them, art remains primarily an asset, not a liability, so
the rules for endowments and program-related assets should control
decisions about art collections owned by universities. But if the law
recognized the liability aspect of art collections, we might have better rules
to accommodate that feature and reduce the burden of maintaining an art
collection. In this regard, there is mostly a blank slate on which to create
law. So here are a couple of suggestions that might prevent deaccessioning
problems from arising.
First, the tax law might recognize the liability problem and encourage
gifts that underwrite the costs of upkeeping art by increasing the charitable
contribution deduction available for those gifts, at least to the level
necessary so that gifts of art do not create greater donor benefits than gifts
that underwrite the maintenance of that art. This suggestion attempts to
even out the incentive for gift-giving that is currently skewed in favor of
gifts of art compared to gifts of money. 166 Second, the state law rules
governing cy pres or deviation 167 might address the burden that collections
place on institutions. As described in the context of the Fisk case above,
where gifts of art are subject to restrictions, a court determination is
necessary to release the restrictions, except where the donor is willing and
able to agree to the modification.168 The reviewing court must determine
that it is impossible or impracticable (or wasteful, in some states) 169 for the
organization to comply with the restrictions in order to release them. The
kinds of restrictions that attach to gifts of art can be particularly expensive.
For example, a gift instrument might require that the collection always be
displayed to the public, or that it always be shown intact, or that no work
166. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
167. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deviation doctrine" as "[a] principle allowing
variation from a term of a will or trust to avoid defeating the document's purpose." Id. at
516.
168. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTiONAL FUNDS ACT § (7)(b) (1972) ("If the court finds
that the restriction is obsolete, inappropriate, or impracticable, it may by order release the
restriction in whole or in part.").
169. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTIToONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(b) (2006) ("The court.
may modify a restriction contained in a gift instrument... if the restriction has become
impracticable or wasteful, if it impairs the management or investment of the fund, or if... a
modification of a restriction will further the purposes of the fund.").
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may be sold.' 70 The limitations imposed on the Barnes collection were all
very costly because they limited the admission price, travel of the
collection, and the number of visitors allowed.17 1 The law could recognize
the liability aspect of art collections by considering these restrictions, along
with the ongoing costs and the supporting endowments in cy pres and
deviation proceedings. Where a donor has given sufficient funds to
maintain the works, a court might be more strict in upholding restrictions.
But where the art primarily constitutes a liability for the institution, rather
than an asset, courts should be more willing to modify donor restrictions.
Another issue connected to the liability aspect of art collections is
disclosure. The current treatment of these collections lacks transparency.
While disclosure is relevant to the asset side also, the current practice
concerning art collections seems to over count the liability and ignore the
asset value. The Metropolitan Museum of Art included the following note
in its latest financial statement:
The collections are maintained for public exhibition, education,
and research in furtherance of public service, rather than for
financial gain. In conformity with accounting policies generally
followed by art museums, the value of the Museum's collections
has been excluded from the Balance Sheet, and gifts of art
objects are excluded from revenue in the Statement of Activities.
Purchases of art objects by the Museum are recorded as
decreases in net assets in the Statement of Activities. Pursuant to
state law and Museum policy, proceeds from the sale of art and
related insurance settlements are recorded as temporarily
restricted net assets for the acquisition of art. 
172
This practice means that the art collection does not show up as an
asset at all on the museum's financial statements, and at least some
universities with art collections have apparently followed this example. 
17
Nevertheless, "gifts and grants" are included in museum revenue,
174
creating an apparent inconsistency between gifts of art and other gifts to the
170. The Barnes Collection is a good example of a donor putting expensive restrictions
on art. See Nivala, supra note 76, at 485-86 ("He [Barnes] displayed ... works in a novel,
intermingled manner... he ordered that his arrangement be maintained without change.").
171. See id. at 494-95.
172. THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2007-2008, at
61 (2008), http://www.metmuseum.org/about/pdf/annual-report/Entire-AR08-WEB.pdf
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] (emphasis added).
173. The Metropolitan Museum of Art's financial statements do not list their art
collections as assets. See generally id.
174. See id. at 52 (showing twenty-eight percent of The Metropolitian Museum of Art's
revenue to come from gifts and grants).
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museums. The maintenance costs are also reflected in the financial
statements. 75 The Internal Revenue Service's new Form 990, which tax-
exempt organizations must file, includes a section that organizations with
art collections must complete. However, the disclosure required is
derivative of the financial statement reporting of the organization, so fails
to provide additional transparency.1
76
In addition, institutions occasionally buy and sell art, and then the
costs/proceeds of those sales do appear in the financial statements. Before
the Rose Art Museum debacle, Brandeis had quietly sold artwork, the gains
from which it reported on its 2007 Form 990--over $5 million. 17 In The
Metropolitan Museum of Art's annual report, the cash proceeds from
deaccessioning appear in the income statement as revenue from "non-
operating assets."' 178 Because museums do not treat their art collections as
endowment assets in the numbers that they report, though occasionally the
artwork does turn into money, it appears as if the proceeds materialize from
thin air. Until it is sold, the art is invisible to the public perusing an
institution's disclosures (and sometimes literally because hardly anyone
visits it before a deaccessioning battle, as in the case of The Gross Clinic).
When financial information about a work is disclosed on account of a sale
or purchase, it can consequently give a misleading picture of the
institution's financial condition and management.
CONCLUSION: PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY THE TREATMENT OF UNIVERSITY
ART COLLECTIONS
The major contribution of this Article is the taxonomy that it
describes to explain the current confusion over university deaccessioning
and its argument for a contextual analysis of institutional obligations in the
law of nonprofit governance. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to map out the
practical consequences of the analysis and how the law might reflect the
multi-functional role of art in the lives of organizations other than
museums. As I have argued, for universities, the legal standards need to
reflect the hybrid nature of art as both cultural property and instrumental
175. See id. at 53 (showing seventeen percent of The Museum of Metropolitan Art's
operating costs are for maintenance and operating services).
176. See IRS Form 990, Schedule D, Part III: Supplemental Financial Statements (OMB
No. 1545-0047) (2009).
177. Brandeis University, IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2007).
178. See ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 172, at 59, 61 (identifying "changes in net assets
pertaining to acquisition and deaccession of collection items" as being part of non-operating
assets).
2010]
HeinOnline  -- 44 New Eng. L. Rev. 575 2009-2010
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
property within the university's mission.179 Within the instrumental, we
also need to acknowledge the complex role of the art collection in the life
of the institution and its nature as endowment, program asset, and
liability. 8 ° The dominant character of a collection will ebb and flow over
time, and vary from one institution to another. Trustees are in the best
position to weigh these competing concerns.
To reflect both the cultural property and instrumental property
aspects, it would be appropriate for the law to impose some heightened
standard for decisions respecting deaccessioning from university art
collections for purposes outside the strict museum standards, without
privileging art collections too much compared to other assets owned by
universities. I would propose that nonprofit law loosely borrow from the
jurisprudence of takeover defenses in the business law area and apply an
enhanced best-judgment rule to decisions to sell art.181 Applying an
enhanced standard to deaccessioning decisions serves to make clear that art
collections are special, and trustees should recognize their exceptional
nature at every decision they make concerning them.
Enhanced deliberation should apply to acquisitions of art, as well as
dispositions, so that gifts of art are accepted by universities with extra care.
Universities should consider whether they can afford to maintain and
display the art they acquire. They should adopt parameters for endowing
the upkeep of their collections, and attempt to raise maintenance funds
alongside gifts of art, particularly when the gifts are restricted. The
proposal for equalizing the tax treatment of art and cash for underwriting
gifts of art suggested above' 82 would make it easier for institutions to
maintain collections that they own. Universities or other organizations
concerned with university-owned collections could design templates for
gifts and policies for underwriting art so that universities know what their
responsibilities will be in maintaining collections. Without guidance, it may
be difficult for institutions to make a realistic assessment of what it takes to
keep a university museum operating in perpetuity.
Decisions about deaccessioning should likewise be governed by a rule
of enhanced deliberation, without courts usurping the discretion of trustees.
Both the endowment rules and the program asset rules, as well as the
179. See discussion supra Parts I.B-II.B.
180. See discussion supra Part IIC.
181. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985), the Delaware
Supreme Court recognized an "enhanced duty" of directors responding to takeover threats,
and imposed a requirement that their defensive actions be reasonable in relation to the threat
to the corporation. This proposal loosely borrows that approach by requiring extra attention
to a particular issue that would be reviewable by a court, but then protecting trustee
decisions under the best-judgment rule where procedures were sufficient.
182. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
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business-law cases, vest ultimate decisionmaking authority in the
governing body, though the contours differ somewhat.' 83 The law generally
recognizes that it's a good idea to let the professionals do their work, and
this is good policy for nonprofit organizations as well as business
organizations. Unfortunately, the challengers to university deaccessioning
decisions misunderstand the law and the obligations that university trustees
have to their educational mission. To correct this misconception, courts
need to strictly apply standing rules to prevent unwarranted injunctions
against sales decisions, such as the one temporarily imposed on Randolph
College. 184 Courts also need to make clear that the American Association of
Museums' and the Association of Art Museum Directors' policies are not
legal rules enforceable against all institutions that hold art collections.
An enhanced best-judgment rule for deaccessioning decisions would
impose a higher standard of investigation and transparency to reflect the
importance of art to the public interest, but remain procedural, in keeping
with the dominant approach of nonprofit governance law. The purpose and
effect of enhanced deliberation would be to make it a little bit harder for a
university to sell art than securities, but not impossible. Universities with
art collections should have deaccessioning policies, along with the other
policies that have become standard for good nonprofit governance. 85 We
should expect that university deaccessioning policies will differ from
museum policies and reflect a greater willingness to deaccession. The key
function of such a policy is that it creates necessary frictions to slow down
the institutional response and prevent panic-induced selling. Going a step
further than simply allowing universities to design their own policies, states
may want to require that institutions follow prescribed procedures in
reaching decisions about deaccessioning. But in no case should university
trustees lose the power to assess the role of the art collection in their
charitable mission.
Brandeis should have collected sufficient information, consulted
interested parties, and notified the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
when it decided to close its museum and sell $350 million worth of art.
186
Better examples of sufficient deliberation include the University of Iowa
and the New York Public Library. After the flood, Iowa's process
minimized legal action and kept the Pollock at the University: the state
regents requested a report, the University prepared it in consultation with a
183. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1-2.
184. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
185. The new Form 990, which exempt organizations must file with the Internal Revenue
Service, requires that organizations state whether they have conflict of interest policies and
whistleblower policies, among others. See IRS Form 990, Part VI, Section B.
186. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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variety of people, and the regents dropped the subject. The University also
has procedures for sales that it would have followed if it determined to sell
the Pollock.187 While good process will often slow things down, encourage
fundraising, and prevent sales, it also might support a decision to sell. The
New York Public Library's sale of Kindred Spirits is also an example of
thorough process leading to sale.188 The library had convened an art
committee chaired by trustee Neil Rudenstine, a former Harvard University
President, 89 which prepared an exhaustive internal report and deliberated
for two years in reaching its decision to sell the painting. 90 The Charities
Bureau of the New York Attorney General's Office approved the sale.' 9'
An enhanced deliberative process should serve as a defense against any
legal challenge, and a model for good nonprofit governance.
On the transparency issue, states might want to mandate more clear
disclosure concerning art collections than the Form 990 requires so that
interested parties are at least aware of how an institution is conceptualizing
its art collection, pursuant to the taxonomy described in this Article. The
financial statements should not allow universities to create value from
nothing, as seems to occur under the current standards. 92 States might also
mandate that institutions make public decisions of what they deaccession
for operating funds so that donors and others can assess whether an
institution is shifting its focus, addressing financial challenges
appropriately, or acting recklessly. The Indianapolis Museum of Art offers
a model of a searchable database of deaccessioned works on its website.
93
Transparency accompanied by clear trustee power is far preferable to the
current regime of little transparency and ambiguous legal standards.
In another project, I will explore more fully the nature of the public's
interest that should inform the legal standards for art collections. There is a
legitimate fear about art leaving the charitable sector and falling into
private hands, never to be seen by the public again. However, the art at
issue in the cases of university deaccessioning discussed here have not
generally presented that problem. Trustees deciding whether to sell need to
consider the effect their decision will have on protection and accessibility
187. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
188. See Lee Rosenbaum, At the New York Public Library, It's Sell First, Raise Money
Later, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2005, at D7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB1 13079900058884594.html ("The art committee's report, produced after two years of
deliberation, recommended [a sale] .... ).
189. Id. ("Neil Rudenstine ... (was] a former Harvard University president . .
190. Id.
191. Id. ("The Attorney General's Charities Bureau validated the ... process . .
192. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
193. IMA Collections: Deaccessioned Artworks, http://www.imamuseum.org/art/
collections/deaccession (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
[Vol. 44:541
HeinOnline  -- 44 New Eng. L. Rev. 578 2009-2010
ENDOWMENTS & ART COLLECTIONS
of the art at issue, but their fiduciary obligations run to the university. Sale
to a museum is generally desirable because museums are good at
preservation and presentation of art-better than universities. Fisk's
proposed arrangement with Crystal Bridges, which would allow each of
them to show the collection for half the year, seems to lose virtually
nothing for the Fisk art students and the people of Tennessee, while gaining
quite a bit for the people of Arkansas and for the preservation of the
collection. Fisk's other educational programs also benefit from the
arrangement. Attorneys general should be careful to consider the broader
public interest in art and contain their parochial instincts when consulting
with universities over their deaccessioning decisions.
Finally, university deaccessioning is a misguided focus for those who
fear that the public's access to art may be diminished. Legal
encouragement for charitable gifts is a much better approach for
maximizing public access to art than a campaign of publicly shaming
universities in financial distress. Those who are really concerned about the
public's loss of access to art should redirect their energies toward
reenactment of the estate tax, which is repealed at the moment. 94 A robust
estate tax, with its deduction for gifts to charities, is much more crucial to
protecting the public interest in art than a rule that would require that
universities go bankrupt before they can sell their art collections.
194. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
15 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); cf John Schwartz, This Year, the
Tax Code Is My Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at B9.
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